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In 1979, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (BIA) accountable to its internal tribal 
consultation policy in Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus.1 
This holding contradicted the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
(APA) general rule that an agency’s internal policy and guidance 
are not judicially enforceable.2 It also established a precedent that 
supported a small line of cases that held similarly—in some 
circumstances, Eighth Circuit courts have forced agencies to 
follow their internal guidance when it comes to dealing with Indian 
tribes. 
                                                                                                             
* Copyright 2015 John Robinson Jr., J.D. 2014, University of Utah College of 
Law. John practices natural resources law in Salt Lake City. Contact him at 
mainerobinson@gmail.com. 
1 Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979). 
2 See infra Part II. 
2 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:1 
 
This Article examines the Eighth Circuit’s divergence from 
normative judicial enforcement under the APA and the 
ramifications thereof. This divergence has only been applied in 
narrow circumstances so far, namely, where an Indian tribe is the 
party seeking enforcement and the defendant agency has a 
consultation policy that applies to the situation. In such 
circumstances, federal common law attaches to the agency action 
through the Indian trust doctrine3 and results in judicial 
enforcement where there otherwise would be none. In this way, 
federal common law trumps the APA, a concept that this Article 
designates the binding guidance principle (“the Principle”). 
 After analyzing the Eighth Circuit’s jurisprudence and 
explaining the Principle, this Article asks whether Indian tribes can 
expand the Principle to provide protection against adverse agency 
action outside of the tribal consultation context. For instance, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated an 
Environmental Justice Policy in 2010 (“EJ Policy”) in which it 
sought to avoid unfair treatment of indigenous populations.4 Under 
a typical APA analysis, this document would merely provide 
guidance to the EPA and would not create rights for Indian 
tribes— the EPA may strive to act in accordance with the policy, 
but the policy does not force it to do so. This Article uses the 
EPA’s EJ Policy as a foil, and suggests that tribes should leverage 
the Principle to render the EJ Policy, or policies similar to the EJ 
policy, enforceable.  
To those ends, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I 
addresses background material and focuses on how the Indian trust 
doctrine arose, why it is important, and the canons of the doctrine 
itself. Part II examines the judicial enforceability of agency policy 
and guidance generally. It then explains the Indian trust doctrine’s 
affect on judicial enforcement of agency policy in the Eighth 
Circuit. That analysis also shows the genesis and application of the 
Principle. Finally, part III distills a succinct rule and evidences 
                                                                                                             
3 See infra Part I.B (explaining the Indian Trust Doctrine). 
4 OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON. & INNOVATION, U.S. ENVTL.  PROT. AGENCY, 
INTERIM GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTION (July 2010), 
http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nepa/includes/considering_ej_in_rulemaking_guide07
2010.pdf [hereinafter EJ POLICY]. 
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how the Principle allows tribes to hold more agencies 
accountable to more of their policy and guidance documents. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
Federal Indian law describes the body of law developed to deal 
with the relationship between the federal government, the Indian 
tribes, and the states. Indian law generally, however, may reference 
non-federal sources: tribal law, international law, executive orders, 
treaties that predate the Constitution, and state law.5 Under this 
umbrella, federal common law treats Indian tribes as “domestic, 
dependent nations”—domestic because they exist within the 
borders of the United States and dependent because they are 
subject to United States’ power.6 However, Indian tribes retain 
some trappings of sovereign nationhood because they exercise 
many police powers within their own boundaries.7 
This part proceeds in two sections. First, section A provides a 
brief history of white colonial expansion and its effects on the 
Indian population. Indeed, “Indian law and history are the opposite 
sides of the same coin.”8 That history is requisite for understanding 
the Indian trust doctrine itself, explained in section B below. 
 
A. Historical Perspective: European Interaction with Indian 
Peoples 
Historical perspective gives context to the philosophical 
underpinnings of Indian law. Context is of central importance to 
Indian law because the Indian trust doctrine developed in direct 
response to the horrible treatment of Indian populations in the 
Americas. Indeed, history is the “most significant” source within 
the “wealth of seemingly non-legal data [that] affects the legal 
relationship between Indians and the federal government.”9 
                                                                                                             
5 See FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§1–2 (2012 ed.). 
6 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). For instance, Indian tribes 
cannot negotiate with foreign nations on a government-to-government basis—
for such purposes they are considered under the jurisdiction of the United States. 
Id.; see also COHEN, supra note 5. 
7 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16 (explaining that the relationship between 
Indians and the U.S. “is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in 
existence”). 
8 COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.01. 
9 Id. 
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European justification for colonization in the “New World” 
extends back at least to the Crusades, when the Vatican announced 
a papal right to use force against non-Christian peoples.10 Implicit 
in this papal right, was the Church’s condonation of taking non-
Christian lands by the sword. Somewhat later, in the wake of 
heinous Portuguese and Spanish brutality in the New World,11 a 
Dominican theologian named de Victoria argued against and 
changed somewhat the earlier attitude. Under de Victoria’s new 
analysis, legal acquisition and political domination of Indian lands 
required the prior consent of the Indian tribes.12 Essentially, de 
Victoria rejected the notion that European powers could simply 
take the land they wanted by force. He also rejected the idea that 
the Indians held no right to their land simply because they were 
non-Christian.13 Accordingly, simple discovery of the Indian lands 
alone did not convey complete title and ownership to the 
“discoverer” under de Victoria’s theory.14  
Chief Justice Marshall explained this theory—the doctrine of 
discovery—in Johnson v. M’Intosh.15 In that case, Chief Justice 
Marshall explained, “the great nations of Europe were eager to 
appropriate to themselves” as much of the New World as they 
could.16 They assumed that “the superior genius of Europe might 
claim an ascendency” over the Indians, which they justified by 
“convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the 
[Indians] by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity.”17  
However, said Chief Justice Marshall, the European nations 
needed some way to avoid constant war amongst themselves as 
they all sought fulfillment of the same goal—acquisition of the 
extensive, newly discovered lands.18 To that end, they needed to 
                                                                                                             
10 Id. § 1.02. 
11 HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492–PRESENT 
7 (Twentieth Anniversary ed. 1999) (quoting the priest Las Casas, who wrote 
that, by 1508, European occupation of Hispaniola had resulted in over 3 million 
Indian deaths). 
12 COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02. 
13 Id. 
14 COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02. On the other hand, a European power could gain 
land through a “just” war such as when an Indian tribe was the aggressor. Id. 
15 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 576 (1823). 
16 Id. at 572. 
17 Id. at 573. 
18 Id. 
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establish a common principle that all the nations would 
follow. “This principle was, that discovery gave title to the 
government by [whom] it was made.”19 However, acquiring title 
by discovery only worked to exclude the other European powers 
from the land—the Indians still held “a legal as well as just claim 
to retain possession of [their land].”20 Thus, the doctrine of 
discovery vested title to the discovered lands in the discoverer, but 
did not grant a possessory interest—European ownership was 
subject to “the Indian right of occupancy.”21 
Since the doctrine of discovery only gives the discoverer title, 
and not possession, European states still had to physically acquire 
the lands from the Indians by moving in on their land and taking 
possession of it. This idea, that Indians retained some, although 
limited, legal right to land colored dealings with the Indian tribes 
throughout the colonial and expansionist eras. Indeed, the earliest 
reservations, “which were steadily reduced in size,” arose out of 
peace treaties that (at least facially) respected an Indian right to 
land.22 
White settlers also bought Indian lands through trade by 
offering “new weapons, new drinks, and new tools, all of which 
were capable of destroying Indian life, health, and culture.”23 
Acquiring Indian lands “[i]n exchange for these deadly but 
apparently irresistible gifts” was seemingly easy.24 However, these 
manipulative methods of gaining land necessarily stimulated 
resentment and animosity amongst the Indian tribes, and hostilities 
ensued. To appease the tribes and restore peace, the British 
government released the Royal Proclamation of 1763,25 which 
reserved all lands west of the Appalachian Mountains to the 
                                                                                                             
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
21 Id. But see Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of 
the United States, 31 GEO. L. J. 1, 7 (1942) (“These are subtleties of feudal legal 
theory which meant nothing to the Indians.”). 
22 BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, THE NATIVE PEOPLES OF NORTH AMERICA: A HISTORY 
120 (2005). 
23 Cohen, supra note 21, at 6. 
24 Id. 
25 The Royal Proclamation - October 7, 1763, THE AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/proc1763.asp (“[A]nd whereas great 
Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to 
the great Prejudice of our Interests, and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said 
Indians.”). 
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Indians and proscribed further land deals with the tribes. 
Unfortunately, the Proclamation’s edicts did not last long.  
After the American Revolutionary War, federalism issues 
continued to confuse relations between the Indians and the 
European settlers. The federal government strove for a 
conservative Indian policy, but the states remained eager to acquire 
Indian lands.26 This federalist dynamic eventually resulted in 
article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution—the Congress 
shall have the power to regulate commerce with the Indian 
Tribes;27 Congress did just that. The federal government’s 
constitutional authority displaced the states and allowed it to take 
the lead in dealings with the tribes. 
However, even those federal Indian treaties imbued with moral 
and legal force often went unfulfilled because the government was 
often unwilling to prevent states from violating the tribes’ treaty 
rights.28 During the early and middle 1800s, a states’ rights 
movement was on the rise, which President Jackson generally 
supported.29 The states felt that they did not need to comply with 
federal mandates and proclamations. Soon after Jackson assumed 
the presidency, Southern states began to pass laws encroaching on 
Indian sovereignty. These laws did away with the tribal unit and 
imposed taxes, while denying Indians the right to vote and 
encouraging whites to settle on Indian land.30 Georgia, in 
particular, tried to completely evict the Cherokee Indians from 
within its borders. 
The Tribe fought back in federal court. Cherokee Nation v. 
State of Georgia31 was the first major case to deal with Indian 
                                                                                                             
26 COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02. 
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02, (comparing the 
Indian powers granted to the federal government in the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution). 
28 See COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.03. Additionally, not all treaties even had moral 
and legal force. “Treaties were sometimes consummated by methods amounting 
to bribery, or signed by representatives of only small parts of the signatory 
tribes.” Id. (citing FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE 
HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY (1997)). 
29 See Matthew S. Brogdon, Defending the Union: Andrew Jackson’s 
Nullification Proclamation and American Federalism, 73 REV. POL. 245 (2011) 
(reconciling Jackson’s advocacy of states’ rights with his Nullification 
Proclamation). 
30 ZINN, supra note 11, at 133. 
31 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
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rights and marked the beginning of the Indian trust doctrine. 
In it, the Cherokees sought to enjoin Georgia and its officers from 
enforcing the newly passed anti-Indian laws.32 The Cherokees 
cited a long list of treaties, all of which supported the Cherokee 
Nation’s “exclusive right to their [own] territory, and the exclusive 
right of self government within that territory.”33 The tribe also 
alleged a long list of wrongs perpetrated by Georgia which if 
combined would “annihilate the Cherokees as a political society, 
and seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation which 
have been assured to them by the United States in solemn treaties 
repeatedly made and still in force.”34 
Under Georgia’s new anti-Cherokee law, “the lands within the 
boundary of the Cherokee territory [were] to be surveyed, and to 
be distributed by lottery among the people of Georgia.”35 The 
Cherokees pleaded that, unless the court granted them relief from 
the anti-Cherokee law, only three alternatives remained: they 
would need to either surrender their land and doom their 
civilization, give up their sovereignty and rights, or “arm 
themselves in defenses [sic] of these sacred rights, and fall sword 
in hand, on the graves of their fathers.”36 
In response, Chief Justice Marshall bluntly stated, “a case 
better calculated to excite [the Court’s sympathies] can scarcely be 
imagined.”37 Despite these alleged sympathies, he found that the 
court did not have original jurisdiction to hear the case.38 In order 
to arrive at that decision, Chief Justice Marshall examined the 
relationship between the Indian tribes and the United States.39 
Although the Indian nations had some familiar trappings of a 
                                                                                                             
32 Id. at 1–2. 
33 Id. at 4. In all, the complaint alleged that at least eight treaties existed between 
the Cherokees and British, its colonies, or the United States. Id. at 4–5. 
34 Id. at 15. 
35 Id. at 13. In fact, by the time Cherokee Nation actually came before the Court, 
a Cherokee Indian had been arrested, tried, and executed under Georgia law. To 
illustrate the contentiousness of the moment, Georgia hanged him in direct and 
open defiance of a writ of error to the state supreme court from Chief Justice 
Marshall himself. Id. at 12-13 (“[The state court] promptly resolved, in 
substance, that the supreme court [sic] of the United States had no jurisdiction 
over the subject, and advised the immediate execution of the prisoner.”). 
36 Id. at 10–11. 
37 Id. at 15. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 16–18. 
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foreign state, the “condition of the Indians in relation to the United 
States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in 
existence.”40 Instead of existing as foreign nations, the Indian 
nations “may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic 
dependent nations . . . meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. 
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian”41 Because the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign nation 
cognizable under the Constitution, the Court dismissed the case for 
want of jurisdiction—“If it be true that the Cherokee nation have 
rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be 
asserted.”42 
Chief Justice Marshall’s language in Cherokee Nation forked 
into two distinct prongs. First, his comparison of the federal 
government’s association with Indian tribes as a guardian-to-ward 
relationship established the idea that the government owed a 
fiduciary duty to the tribes. This was the first acknowledgement of 
what later became known as the Indian trust doctrine. 
In stark contrast, the second prong of Marshall’s decision—the 
abdication of jurisdiction over Indian disputes with states—gave 
President Jackson the perfect tactic for Indian repression and 
removal. According to this reasoning, the federal government was 
not breaking its solemn word to the Indians when it failed to 
intervene in that repression and removal; the government was able 
to claim that it was powerless to assist the Indians in defending 
themselves against the states in the divided federalist system.43 As 
President Jackson’s Secretary of War stated, “It is not your Great 
Father [the President] who does this; but the laws of the Country, 
which he and every one of his people is bound to regard.”44 Based 
on this reasoning, the federal government would not force Indians 
to move westward because that would violate federal treaties. 
However, the federals warned, if Indians did not go west, state 
laws would apply, destroy the Indian’s tribal and personal rights, 
and render them “subject to endless harassment and invasion by 
                                                                                                             
40 Id. at 16. 
41 Id. at 17. 
42 Id. at 20. 
43 See generally COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.03. 
44 ZINN, supra note 11, at 133 (quoting Secretary of War Jon Eaton). 
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white settlers coveting their land.”45  
Without the protections offered in treaty by the federal 
government, whites displaced the Indians east of the Mississippi 
under color of state law.46 As the process that continued across the 
continent, tribes were pushed west, isolated on small and remote 
reservations, and harassed. By the late 1800s, there was no place 
left for Indian; to be put and “there was little sympathy for the 
preservation of [their] way of life.”47 Congress then shifted its 
efforts to assimilating Indians into white society, a process that 
resulted in the transfer of another 90 million acres away from the 
tribes into private hands, as well as a mass destruction of tribal 
culture.48 This historical lens colored and controlled development 
of the Indian trust doctrine. 
 
B. The Indian Trust Doctrine in Short 
At the core, the Indian trust doctrine originates from tribal 
sovereignty that preexisted white settlement of this continent49 and 
“the unique trust relationship between the United States and the 
Indians.”50 The trust relationship grows out of early Supreme Court 
jurisprudence discussed above and encompasses the rules by which 
courts interpret treaties and agreements with the tribes, as well as 
federal statutes and executive orders. The doctrine includes the 
following four canons: 
 
1. Courts give liberal construction to treaties, laws, and 
statutes in favor of the Indians;51  
2. Courts resolve ambiguities in documents in favor of the 
Indians;52 
3. Courts construe agreements as the Indians would have 
understood them at the time of the agreement;53  
                                                                                                             
45 ZINN, supra note 11, at 133. 
46 See generally COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.03. 
47 COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.04. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. § 1.01. 
50 Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985). 
51 E.g., Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. at 247 (“[I]t is well established that 
treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians.”). 
52 E.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970) (“[A]ny 
doubtful expressions in [documents] should be resolved in the Indians' favor.”). 
53 E.g., Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 631 (“[T]his Court has often held that 
treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as they would have understood 
10 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:1 
 
4. Statutes preserve Indian property rights and sovereignty 
unless Congress clearly intended otherwise.54 
 
The guardian-ward relationship announced in Cherokee Nation 
and described above does not explain all of these canons. Indeed, 
the canons gained a strong protective element in 1832, the year 
after Cherokee Nation. In that year, Georgia returned to the 
Supreme Court on a somewhat similar issue; this time the court 
found that it had jurisdiction over the case. In Worcester v. 
Georgia, a missionary appealed his conviction for living on 
Cherokee lands in violation of Georgia law, which required a 
permit to do so.55 Chief Justice Marshall overturned Worcester’s 
conviction and used the opportunity to expound upon the 
relationship between the federal government and the tribes.56 The 
Cherokees, Justice Marshall said, “are under the protection of the 
United States.”57 However, according to the Chief Justice, being 
under federal protection did not completely take away the tribe’s 
status as a distinct political entity—it retained some measure of 
sovereignty over its own lands. That is, being under the protection 
of the federal government “involved, practically, no claim [by the 
United States] to [Indian] lands, [and] no dominion over their 
persons.”58 
Chief Justice Marshall further explained that “[p]rotection does 
not imply the destruction of the protected” and that the whole point 
of the reservation system was to ensure survival of the tribe.59 The 
Chief Justice also announced that treaties should be construed in 
favor of the tribe,60 a canon discussed below. He explained that it 
is “reasonable to suppose, that the Indians who could not write, 
and most probably could not read, who certainly were not critical 
                                                                                                             
them.”). 
54 E.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1311 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[A] clear expression of Congressional intent is necessary 
before a court may construe a federal statute so as to impair tribal 
sovereignty.”). 
55 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542 (1832). 
56 Id. at 562. 
57 Id. at 521 (emphasis added). 
58 Id. at 552 (discussing a treaty with Britain but also assuming that similar 
language held a similar meaning with U.S.-made treaties). 
59 Id. at 552–53. 
60 Id. at 582. 
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judges of our language,” would not agree to treaty terms that 
violated their self-determination, so treaty terms should be 
understood “in the sense in which it was most obviously used [by 
the tribe].”61 He went on to couch Indian treaties in familiar 
federalist terms—a treaty was a grant of rights from the tribe to the 
federal government, with the tribe reserving for itself all the 
powers not explicitly given away.62 Chief Justice Marshall’s 
reasoning echoes the Tenth Amendment.63 
In many ways, Worcester used the paternalistic attitude that 
Chief Justice Marshall expressed in Cherokee Nation to establish 
and recognize the United States’ duty to protect the tribes, their 
lands, and their sovereignty. Originally, the protection extended to 
guard tribes against the individual states and the unrelenting 
pressure of white intrusion on Indian lands. Over time, though, the 
duty has expanded to issues including environmental, resource, and 
heritage. For instance, the Native American Grave Protection and 
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)64 aims to protect Indian cultural 
heritage by, among other things, returning control over remains 
and artifacts to Indian tribes.65 
The Indian trust doctrine does not work solely through 
affirmative congressional lawmaking. Indeed, the doctrine’s 
canons control because “the standard principles of statutory 
construction do not have their usual force in cases involving Indian 
law.”66 In this way, the canons themselves give the Indian trust 
doctrine teeth—the trust relationship would be meaningless if the 
trust canons did not trump competing canons and prudential 
values.67  
For example, the Indian trust doctrine overrides the 
presumption that a state holds title to the beds and banks of its 
navigable water under the equal footing doctrine.68 Indeed, the 
                                                                                                             
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
this Constitution . . . are reserved to the States.”).  
64 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
3013 (2006). 
65 See id. § 3002. 
66 Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). 
67 See COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.02. 
68 Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1970) (holding that the 
Choctaw Nation, and not Oklahoma, owns the bed of the Arkansas River); Idaho 
12 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:1 
 
Indian trust can even override deference to agencies under 
Chevron because of “the trust relationship between the United 
States and the Indian American people.”69 
When invoked, the Indian trust doctrine is a powerful ally to 
the tribes in many circumstances. Through it, courts are able to 
protect tribal interests that would otherwise be disregarded. The 
remainder of this Article addresses one of those circumstances in 
which the trust doctrine is particularly powerful, specifically, the 
circumstance that arises when the Indian trust doctrine interacts 
with federal agency guidance and activates the Principle. The 
following analysis suggests that a strong understanding of the 
Principle empowers tribal litigation and may extend the federal 
government’s protection of tribes to cover enforcement of 
nonlegislative rules. 
 
II. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF AGENCY POLICY & GUIDANCE 
This part discusses the Administrative Procedure Act, 
specifically the sections that define a “rule.” Underneath the 
APA’s broad umbrella, any “agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect” that “interpret[s], or 
prescribe[s] law or policy” counts as a “rule.”70 However, agency 
rulemaking is a broad concept and therefore lawyers typically 
distinguish between legislative and nonlegislative rules. A 
legislative rule is, with limited exceptions, promulgated after 
undergoing a notice and comment period; it has binding legal 
effect.71 A nonlegislative rule, on the other hand, does not undergo 
notice and comment procedures, and typically lacks the force of 
law.72 Agency policy documents are nonlegislative rules, and are 
the focus of this Article. Section A discusses “normal” judicial 
enforcement of nonlegislative agency guidance and policy. Section 
                                                                                                             
v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 281 (2001) (holding that the Coeur D’Alene 
Tribe holds title to the bed of Lake Coeur d’Alene, not Idaho). 
69 Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Ramah 
Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[N]ormal rules 
of construction do not apply when Indian treaty rights, or even non-treaty 
matters involving Indians, are at issue.”) (quotation omitted). 
70 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2011). 
71 See William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1321, 1322 (2001). 
72 Id. 
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B discusses the binding guidance principle, which arises 
when the Indian trust doctrine attaches to nonlegislative rules and 
binds the agency to act accordingly. 
 
A. Judicial Enforcement of Agency Policy in Typical 
Circumstances 
Typically, courts do not enforce nonlegislative rules because 
they fall under the exception to rulemaking described in section 
553 of the APA.73 Under the exception, policy documents do not 
undergo notice and comment. Without notice and comment, the 
documents are not legislative rules and therefore do not create 
rights or duties in the public.  
However, the title an agency gives a document does not end the 
issue: a rule by any other name would still be a rule.74 That is, an 
agency cannot promulgate a rule under cover of “guidance” to 
avoid legislative rulemaking procedures. Therefore, courts test the 
enforceability of a document by measuring what the document 
does rather than what it is called. If a document creates rights or 
duties in the public, then courts will enforce it. Otherwise, courts 
generally will not.75  
The Ninth Circuit developed a simple two-prong test to 
differentiate between legislative (enforceable) rules and non-
legislative (not enforceable) ones. This Article uses the test 
announced in United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots76 
as an illustrative example for two reasons. First, the circuit 
commonly applies its test to the type of nonlegislative documents 
at issue in this Article.77 Second, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
this area is clearer than that of the Supreme Court’s. 
Under Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, courts apply a two-part test 
to determine whether an agency pronouncement may be enforced 
                                                                                                             
73 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2015). For the purposes of this Article, there is no 
substantive difference between “policy” and “guidance.” 
74 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 1 (expressing this 
concept rather elegantly). 
75 The Indian trust exception to this “general” rule of thumb is the focus of this 
Article. See supra part II.B. 
76 United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
77 Other circuits either use similar logic or directly incorporate the Ninth Circuit 
test. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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against a federal agency. The agency’s document must both: (1) 
prescribe substantive rules; and (2) conform to specific procedural 
requirements.78 The first prong requires that the pronouncement in 
question be “legislative in nature”—an agency’s “interpretive 
rules, general statements of policy or rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice” do not qualify as substantive.79 The second 
prong examines whether the agency promulgated the 
pronouncement “pursuant to a specific statutory grant of authority 
and in conformance with the procedural requirements imposed by 
Congress.”80 
The Ninth Circuit applied this test in River Runners for 
Wilderness v. Martin, which is a prime example of application 
outside the Indian law context.81 There, plaintiff River Runners 
challenged the National Park Service’s (NPS) 2006 decision to 
allow continued use of motorized rafts in Grand Canyon National 
Park.82 Plaintiffs based their claim, in part, on the fact that NPS’s 
2006 decision conflicted with NPS’s then-existing policy to 
maintain the wilderness qualities of the park, which would exclude 
motorized travel. According to River Runners, NPS’s 2001 Park 
Service Management Policy created an enforceable duty to restrict 
motorized rafts in the park, and that the 2006 NPS decision to 
allow such rafts was a violation of that duty.83 Therefore, the case 
turned on whether the Management Policy placed a judicially 
enforceable duty on the Park Service. 
The court applied the Eclectus Parrots test to River Runner’s 
claims, and found that the “the 2001 [NPS] [p]olicies are not 
enforceable against the Park Service.”84 Under the test’s first 
prong, the court noted that even NPS’s use of mandatory language 
in the 2001 policies did not transform the document into a set of 
substantive rules.85 Although the agency required its own 
                                                                                                             
78 River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting the test as set forth in United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus 
Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
79 Id. at 1071. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1067. 
83 Id. 
84 River Runners, 593 F.3d at 1073. 
85 Id. at 1071; accord Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (examining the same policy and finding that the “document as a whole 
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adherence to the 2001 policy through the document’s 
preamble, the court noted that NPS reserved the right to modify or 
waive the policy as necessary.86 Therefore, the court concluded 
that the policies were “not intended to have the same force” as 
regulations, do not “purport to create substantive individual rights 
or obligations,” and that NPS intended the policies “only to 
provide guidance within the Park Service, not to establish rights in 
the public generally.”87 
Even though the NPS policy failed under the first prong of 
Eclectus Parrots, the court also examined whether the policy 
satisfied the requisite procedural requirements under the second 
prong of the test. The court found it “particularly noteworthy” that 
the APA required publication of substantive rules, and NPS never 
published the 2001 policy in the Federal Register or the Code of 
Federal Regulations.88 Therefore, outside of Indian law, even 
seemingly binding language cannot create an enforceable duty 
without following correct legislative rulemaking procedure under 
the APA. 
 
1. Disclaiming Language is Largely Irrelevant to Judicial 
Enforceability 
As illustrated in River Runners, courts take note of the type of 
language agencies use in their policy documents. However, courts 
do not generally consider the presence or absence of a disclaimer 
within the policy document as dispositive on whether the 
document is judicially enforceable or not. Indeed, it would be 
                                                                                                             
does not read as a set of rules”). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1072 (quoting Wilderness Soc'y, 434 F.3d at 595); see also W. Radio 
Servs. Co., Inc. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 901 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining that two 
agency documents failed the test because “[n]either is published in the Federal 
Register or the Code of Federal Regulation.”); accord Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs 
Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir.1986) (holding that “[t]he real 
dividing point between regulations and general statements of policy is 
publication in the Code of Federal Regulations”). Contra Davis v. Latschar, 202 
F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that the NPS did bind itself through its 
Management Policy). The court in Davis facially reached the opposite result 
from River Runners. However, in Davis, the plaintiff claimed that the 
Management Policies were binding, and NPS did not argue otherwise. Id. 
Without briefing to the contrary, the court assumed that the Policies bound NPS. 
Id. at 366. 
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strange if an agency disclaimer could overcome the statutory rights 
accorded to citizens by the APA—Congress’s statutory language 
should control reviewability, not an agency’s disclaiming 
language. Instead, courts analyze how an agency actually uses the 
document in question.89  
For example, the D.C. Circuit examined a document that did 
not contain disclaiming language in CropLife America v. EPA.90 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) argued that the 
document could not possibly be enforceable because it was only a 
press release.91 However, the court evaluated whether the agency 
used the document in a manner similar to a rule, rather than 
evaluating the type of document or its lack of disclaiming 
language.92 If an agency “self-servingly disclaims any intention to 
create a rule with the ‘force of law,’ but the record indicates 
otherwise,” then courts can review and enforce the document 
regardless.93 Here, in spite of the document’s non-rule nature, the 
court found that EPA used “clear and unequivocal language” that 
“reflect[ed] an obvious change in established agency practice” and 
created a “binding norm.”94 Therefore, the court held that the press 
release constituted a reviewable binding regulation.95 However, the 
circuit court invalidated the press release because the EPA 
promulgated it without proper process.96 That the EPA 
promulgated the document without notice and comment, yet still 
treated it as binding, made it invalid as a rule.97 
Likewise, courts do not let agencies hide behind a legal 
disclaimer. In Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit 
analyzed the EPA’s “Periodic Monitoring Guidance for Title V 
Operating Permits Programs.”98 The EPA claimed that the 
Guidance was not enforceable because it was neither final nor 
                                                                                                             
89 E.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding 
that an EPA guidance document carried the force and effect of law, and was 
therefore judicially reviewable, even though it contained a broad disclaimer). 
90 Croplife America v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
91 Id. at 881. 
92 See id. at 883. 
93 Id. at 883 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
94 Id. at 881. 
95 Id. at 885. 
96 Id. at 884–85. 
97 Id. at 885. 
98 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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binding.99 However, the court disagreed; the guidance 
document contained statements of legal consequence, placing 
obligations on both “State regulators and those they regulate.”100 
Additionally, the court found the EPA’s disclaimer that the 
guidance was not enforceable to be meaningless in light of the 
document’s overarching purpose and effect.101 
 
B. Atypical Circumstances: The Indian Trust Doctrine Modifies 
Enforceability 
Although the general rule outlined above—guidance and policy 
cannot bind an agency—applies in most circumstances, outlier 
cases do exist. As this Article’s introduction explained, a small line 
of cases have challenged this norm. Taken together, the 
foundational cases are construed, at least in the Eighth Circuit, to 
require agencies to act in accordance with their policy documents 
in the context of Indian law. 
The first of these outlier cases was Morton v. Ruiz, decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1974.102 The opinion included language 
suggesting that an agency could be in violation of the Indian trust 
doctrine if it failed to follow its own internal guidance.103 Indeed, 
agency failure to follow its own procedure “is inconsistent with the 
distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in 
its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited 
people.”104  
In Morton, the BIA’s internal procedure called for publication 
of “all directives that inform the public of privileges and benefits 
available and of eligibility requirements” in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR).105 However, the agency’s benefits manual, 
which the BIA never published in the CFR as required, stated that 
only Indians living “on reservations” could receive general 
                                                                                                             
99 Id. at 1020. 
100 Id. at 1023. 
101 Id. at 1023 (“[T]hrough the Guidance, EPA has given the States their 
‘marching orders’ and EPA expects the States to fall in line.”). 
102 Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
103 Id. at 235 (“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon 
agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal 
procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.”). 
104 Id. at 236. 
105 Id. at 235 (quotations omitted). 
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assistance benefits from the BIA.106 Based on the benefits-manual 
language, the BIA denied an Indian couple’s application for 
assistance because they lived several miles from the reservation’s 
border. Because the benefits manual had not been published 
according to the internal procedure, the Court held that the BIA’s 
“on reservation” requirement was invalid because it “amount[ed] 
to an unpublished ad hoc determination . . . that was not 
promulgated in accordance with [BIA’s] own procedures.”107  
In Morton, the BIA’s “on reservation” requirement failed for 
two reasons. First, the eligibility requirement failed because a 
legislative rule would have been more appropriate to the BIA’s 
purpose.108 Because the Indian plaintiffs identified an underlying 
statutory duty, the Court could have struck down the BIA’s denial 
of benefits under the APA on that basis alone, without reaching the 
issue of BIA’s additional consultation procedure. 
Although the Court could have stopped there, it also addressed 
a second and more important consultation analysis. The Court 
recognized that the BIA’s internal guidance policy—requiring that 
the BIA publish eligibility requirements in the CFR—was a 
procedural requirement additional to the baseline requirements of 
the APA.109 Accordingly, the “on reservation” requirement 
additionally failed because the BIA disregarded its own 
guidance.110 Essentially, the Court reasoned that it could hold the 
agency to a higher standard than the APA required because of the 
Indian trust doctrine.111 The BIA violated the Indian trust doctrine 
when it failed to follow its own guidance because that guidance 
created an expectation (of a particular process) in the Indian 
community.  
The Eighth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s lead in 
                                                                                                             
106 Id. at 199 (emphasis added). 
107 Id. at 236. 
108 See id. at 236 (“The conscious choice of the Secretary not to treat this 
extremely significant eligibility requirement, affecting rights of needy Indians, 
as a legislative-type rule, renders it ineffective . . . .”). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 235 (“[I]t is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . 
. even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise 
would be required.”). 
111 The Court did not use the term “Indian trust doctrine,” but it grounded its 
reasoning in the same principles intrinsic to the trust doctrine, like dependency 
and exploitation. See id. at 235–36. 
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Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus.112 There, the Eighth 
Circuit relied on the Morton precedent in its holding and explained 
that, when the BIA failed to follow its own Indian consultation 
policy, it violated the trust doctrine. The court held that “[f]ailure 
of the Bureau to make any real attempt to comply with its own 
policy of consultation not only violates those general principles 
which govern administrative decision making, but also violates 
‘the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government 
in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited 
people.’”113 
In Oglala Sioux, the BIA removed a reservation’s Agency 
Superintendent because of a conflict of interest that arose when the 
Superintendent’s brother became the Tribe’s president.114 The BIA 
neglected to consult with the Tribe when it removed and replaced 
the Superintendent.115 The removal contradicted the BIA’s tribal 
consultation policy, which provided that “(t)ribes should be 
consulted on recommendations for selection of employees for the 
position of Agency Superintendent.”116 The Oglala Sioux court 
focused on the idea that the BIA’s consultation policy created and 
supported the Tribe’s expectation of additional procedure, namely 
that the Tribe would be an active participant in personnel 
decisions.117 The court also focused on the procedural aspect of the 
guidance despite the fact that it was a nonlegislative rule.118 The 
court held that the BIA violated its own guidelines by making a 
personnel change without conducting meaningful consultation and 
remanded the decision so that consultation could take place.119  
Conversely, other circuits have declined to adopt the Oglala 
Sioux precedent. For example, in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court 
ruling that cited to Oglala Sioux in support of the proposition that 
                                                                                                             
112 Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979). 
113 Id. at 721 (quoting Morton, 415 U.S. 199). 
114 Id. at 710–11. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 717-18 (quotation omitted). 
117 Id. at 721 (stating that the BIA “failed to comply with its own procedures” 
and “[f]ail[ed] . . . to comply with its own policy” in the same paragraph). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 714 (“We also agree that the Bureau's action was procedurally defective 
in that it was not made in accordance with the Bureau's own procedure requiring 
prior consultation with the Tribe.”). 
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the BIA’s consultation guidelines bound the agency.120 On review, 
the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Eighth Circuit precedent: in 
Oglala Sioux, the BIA conceded the binding nature of the 
consultation guidelines; in Hoopa Valley, the BIA did not.121  
Despite Hoopa Valley, the line of cases supporting the 
assertion that the Indian trust doctrine renders agency policy 
enforceable continues to grow. Examples that are more recent can 
be found in the Eighth Circuit, where a number of decisions follow 
the Oglala Sioux precedent. For example, the United States District 
Court for the District of South Dakota explicitly rejected the Ninth 
Circuit’s Hoopa Valley decision and affirmed on different facts 
that the BIA’s consultation policy bound the agency to bring an 
effected tribe into its decision making process.122  
In that case, Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, the BIA made 
personnel changes that affected the Tribe without following its 
own tribal consultation policy.123 The Deer court reviewed a 
thorough history of the BIA’s consultation procedures, including 
Consultation Guidelines, letters to the tribes, and a clarifying order, 
which stated, “[b]ureaus and offices are required to consult with 
the recognized tribal government.”124 Based on that well-
developed record, the court decided that, “[c]learly, [the personnel 
decision] in question falls within these policies of consultation and 
solicitation of advice.”125 Therefore, the court held that the “BIA is 
not to be permitted to disavow its own policies and directives.”126 
Even more recently, the United States District Court for the 
District of South Dakota required consultation with the plaintiff 
tribe, but found that duty to be present in a policy document and in 
                                                                                                             
120 Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1986). 
121 Id. at 1103 (“The [agency guidelines] are not conceded by the Bureau to have 
the force of law, in contrast to the governmental concession made in Oglala 
Sioux.”). 
122 See Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.S.D. 1995) 
(quoting Oglala Sioux’s holding). See also Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. 
Babbitt, 915 F. Supp. 157 (D.S.D. 1996) (holding that BIA has the discretion to 
terminate employees, but must consult with tribe first). 
123 Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395 (D.S.D. 1995). 
124 Id. at 399. 
125 Id. at 398. 
126 Id. at 400 (explicitly rejecting the Ninth Circuits distinction in Hoopa 
Valley); accord Winnebago, 915 F. Supp. at 168 (finding the same result on 
“substantially similar” facts). 
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the applicable statute.127 In this case, the district court 
enjoined the BIA from conducting a school restructuring plan 
without first consulting the affected Tribe.128 The court framed the 
consultation obligation as follows: “Where the BIA has established 
a policy requiring prior consultation with a tribe, and therefore 
created a justified expectation that the tribe will receive a 
meaningful opportunity to express its views before policy is made, 
that opportunity must be given.”129 This is powerful language. 
 
III. DISTILLATION AND APPLICATION 
This analysis begins by examining selected points from the 
jurisprudence discussed above. Section A condenses those points 
into a succinct statement of the binding guidance principle and 
then applies the Principle to the EPA’s EJ policy in section B. 
Finally, it suggests that Indian tribes should leverage the Principle 
to render the EJ policy, or other similar policy documents, 
judicially enforceable. 
 
A. Distillation of a Useful Rule 
As shown through the cases discussed in Part II.B, the Eighth 
Circuit holds at least some agencies accountable to their Indian 
consultation polices. Two common themes in these cases are worth 
noting. First, many of the cases involve situations where the 
affected tribe also had an independent statutory ground for review, 
such as underlying violation of the APA. This Article takes the 
position that an underlying violation is helpful, but not necessary 
for application of the Principle. Although an underlying statutory 
violation seems to make a case’s outcome more certain, when 
courts review a policy standing alone, like in Lower Brule Sioux, 
they may still hold agencies accountable. 
Second, the BIA is generally the acting agency when courts 
apply the Principle, which may carry an inherent bias in the courts. 
For example, the BIA’s mission statement suggests a clearly 
delineated interaction between the agency and Indian tribes, an 
                                                                                                             
127 Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne, 442 F. Supp. 2d 774, 785 (D.S.D. 
2006). 
128 Id. at 785. 
129 Id. at 784 (citing Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395 (D.S.D. 
1995). 
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interaction that does not explicitly exist in other agencies. In fact, 
the BIA’s mission statement embodies the Indian trust doctrine 
itself: “The Bureau of Indian Affairs’ mission is to enhance the 
quality of life, to promote economic opportunity, and to carry out 
the responsibility to protect and improve the trust assets of 
American Indians, Indian tribes and Alaska Natives.”130  
However, no court’s opinion treats the BIA as a “special” 
agency under the Principle, and there is no statutory basis for such 
differentiation under the APA. This Article takes the position that 
the Indian trust doctrine, and thus the binding guidance principle, 
applies to the federal government as a whole, not only to individual 
agencies. Therefore, this Article separates the component parts and 
takes a broad view of the binding guidance principle’s potential 
applicability.  
Taken as a whole, Part II.B shows that Indian tribes have a 
valid cause of action in the Eighth Circuit to make agencies follow 
their own tribal consultation policies. The key question that arises 
then is whether disaggregation of the binding guidance principle 
allows tribes to expand its applicability beyond just the BIA. That 
is, do the underlying tenets of the binding guidance principle 
constrain it to a narrow scope, or are they broad enough to 
encompass and protect other tribal interests? 
To answer that question, this Article collates the Eighth Circuit 
jurisprudence into discrete elements. The courts do not articulate 
any particular test, but a workable paraphrase of their reasoning 
hinges on the question of whether the agency’s consultation policy 
actually creates an expectation of meaningful interaction between a 
given Tribe and an agency. For example, the BIA’s consultation 
guidelines speak specifically about personnel changes; Indians 
could reasonably understand such language to give them the right 
to consult with the BIA, not just the possibility. 
The powerful language in Yankton Sioux illustrates the broader 
applicability of the Principle: “Where the BIA has established a 
policy requiring prior consultation with a tribe, and therefore 
created a justified expectation that the tribe will receive a 
meaningful opportunity to express its views before policy is made, 
                                                                                                             
130 Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/ (Dec. 10, 2013). 
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that opportunity must be given.”131 To the court and the 
tribes, the operative elements in that passage are not the BIA and 
consultation, but that a tribe has justified expectation of a 
meaningful opportunity to affect policy decisions. 
The binding guidance principle stands for the proposition that 
consultation is meaningless unless tribal input actually affects 
substantive decisions as is common amongst procedural 
requirements. For example, the comment procedures of legislative 
rulemaking assure “that the agency will have before it the facts and 
information relevant to a particular administrative problem, as well 
as suggestions for alternative solutions.”132 Likewise, the National 
Environmental Policy Act does not “mandate particular results,” 
but it does require consideration of “relevant environmental 
information.”133 Similarly, the binding guidance principle 
incorporates the Indian trust doctrine’s protectionist values by 
making sure that Indian tribes can take an active role in the 
decision making process—a meaningful opportunity means that 
tribes can help protect themselves. 
Combining the above concepts with Eighth Circuit 
jurisprudence results in a three-part test:  
 
1. Does the Indian trust doctrine apply set of facts? 
2. Does an agency policy or guidance document address 
this particular situation? 
3. Does the document create a justified expectation of 
certain treatment? 
 
If all three are met, then the Principle applies, the document is 
judicially enforceable, and the agency must follow its own 
guidance or face a court order mandating that it do so.134 
 
B. Applying the Rule to Environmental Justice 
EPA’s EJ Policy consists of fifty-three pages and lays out the 
agency’s thoughts on the environmental issues that face low-
                                                                                                             
131 Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne, 442 F. Supp. 2d 774, 785 (D.S.D. 
2006). 
132 Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
133 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
134 The expression might be written as: federal Indian trust common law + 
policy document + justified expectation = judicial enforcement of the policy. 
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income and minority communities.135 The EPA understands that 
disadvantaged populations often bear a disproportionate 
environmental burden and expressly includes indigenous 
populations among the disadvantaged groups. More specifically, 
according to the EJ, an explicit concern is the “actual or potential 
lack of fair treatment or meaningful involvement of . . . tribes in the 
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental 
laws, regulations, and policies.”136  
Accordingly, the EJ Policy shows many similarities with 
Indian-specific consultation policies. For example, the “meaningful 
involvement” language in the EJ Policy mirrors the “meaningful 
and timely input” language used in the BIA’s tribal consultation 
policy.137 On the other hand, the EJ policy uses soft non-binding 
language: the EJ document “helps rule writers understand and 
identify potential EJ concerns.”138 The EJ Policy also includes an 
explicit disclaimer that it “is not legally enforceable.”139 However, 
as discussed above, soft and disclaiming languages are not likely to 
control. 
As a test, let us hypothetically assume that the EPA has taken 
some action that violates its EJ Policy by placing a 
disproportionate environmental burden on an Indian tribe and 
failing to meaningfully involve the tribe.140 Assume that the tribe 
then challenged the EPA’s action in court, first under the “normal” 
analysis of the Ninth Circuit and then under the binding guidance 
principle of the Eighth Circuit.  
Assessing the EJ Policy under the normal framework shows 
                                                                                                             
135 EJ POLICY, supra note 4. 
136 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
137 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT 
CONSULTATION POLICY § B.3 (2000), 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-002000.pdf; see also 
U.S. ENVTL.  PROT. AGENCY, EPA POLICY ON CONSULTATION AND 
COORDINATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES § II (2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/tp/pdf/cons-and-coord-with-indian-tribes-policy.pdf. 
138 EJ POLICY, supra note 4, at ii (emphasis added). 
139 Id.  
140 EPA does have its own tribal consultation policy. See BUREAU OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, supra note 137. EPA does not always consult tribes. This situation 
might arise, for instance, when a tribe intervenes in a suit between EPA and a 
state or private party. When the tribe holds a tertiary interest in EPA’s action, 
the EJ Policy is a more on-point guidance document. Comparative analysis of 
the two is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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that a court would not force EPA compliance with the EJ 
Policy. It certainly fails the first prong of the Eclectus Parrots test 
because it constitutes a general statement of agency policy rather 
than a substantive rule.141 Further, the EPA did not produce the EJ 
Policy in conformance with the legislative rulemaking 
requirements of the APA, nor did it publish the EJ Policy in the 
CFR. Therefore, the EJ Policy fails the second prong of the 
Eclectus Parrots test as well—the EJ Policy does not conform to 
the procedural requirements of legislative rulemaking imposed by 
Congress. Therefore, a reviewing court would not remand the 
EPA’s action and force tribal involvement under the normal test. 
Further, in the typical situation addressed here, the procedural 
requirements imposed by Congress through the APA means that 
any plaintiff asserting that the EJ Policy created an enforceable 
duty would also be asserting that the EPA promulgated the EJ 
Policy improperly. In fact, to argue that the EJ Policy is binding is 
necessarily to argue that it should have undergone official APA 
rulemaking. Even if a plaintiff successfully argued that the Policy 
created an enforceable duty, a court would strike down the EJ 
Policy as improperly promulgated.142  
Now, let us assume that the tribe brought a cause of action that 
relied on the Indian trust doctrine. Applying the new test extracted 
above yields a result different from the normal test: 
  
1. Does the Indian trust doctrine apply? Yes, this is an Indian 
tribe bringing suit in federal court, so the trust doctrine 
applies.  
2. Does an agency policy document address this situation? 
Yes, the EJ Policy states that indigenous communities 
should not carry a disproportionate environmental cost and 
should also be part of the decision making process. 
3. Does the document create a justified expectation of certain 
treatment? Yes, the EJ Policy states both that the tribe 
should receive fair treatment in comparison to other 
groups, and that the tribe should be meaningfully involved 
in the agency’s action. 
 
                                                                                                             
141 See supra Part II.A. 
142 See, e.g., CropLife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (addressing 
this very situation) (discussed in part II.A.2). 
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This new test focuses on the substance of the expectation 
created, whether it was justified or not. When the Principle is 
applied to a document, the disclaimer and promulgation procedure 
fade into obscurity. Indeed, the Principle binds the EPA to the 
proffered purpose of the EJ policy: to “act consistently with the 
federal trust responsibility when taking actions that affect 
tribes.”143 Therefore, how the EPA promulgated the EJ Policy 
makes no difference under the binding guidance principle. 




This Article has attempted to distill a new theory—the binding 
guidance principle—from the case law. Under some 
circumstances, the Indian trust doctrine attaches to agency policy 
and guidance documents and makes them judicially enforceable 
when they would not be otherwise. This forms the substance of the 
Principle.  
At this time, this narrow the Principle exists within the Eighth 
Circuit and has been applied in only limited circumstances. 
However, deeper analysis of the Principle suggests that it need not 
be construed so narrowly because its foundations build on broad 
concepts of general applicability. In this way, tribes have a viable 
and non-frivolous way to make agencies adhere to their own 
guidance documents. Moreover, agencies do not always act in the 
way their own guidance documents suggest—that is a good thing. 
It is at least possible, if not likely, that a concentrated effort 
could expand the Principle both within the Eighth Circuit and to 
other circuits. One can easily imagine tribal interest in holding 
various agencies to any number of their policies, whether in terms 
of environmental justice or otherwise. I hope that this Article is 
useful to those ends. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
143 EJ POLICY, supra note 4, at 14. 
